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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether capital market anomalies are attenuated or exacerbated when more attention is paid to 
public accounting information by individual investors, whose processing of information is less efficient due to 
higher costs involved. Based on Internet search behavior, I create a firm-specific measure of individual 
investors’ attention to accounting information, such as financial reports and earnings, relative to other value-
relevant information, such as price trends. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2011), I find that the post-earnings announcement drift and the profit anomaly are weaker, but the 
accrual anomaly is stronger when individual-investor attention to accounting information is high. The last 
result does not hold for sophisticated investors. Under the premise that anomalies indicate inefficiencies, this 
study provides evidence that individual investors’ acquisition of accounting information does not necessarily 
contribute to informationally efficient capital markets.  
Keywords: investor attention, individual investors, capital market anomalies, capital market efficiency, 
information processing costs, internet search traffic 
JEL Classifications: D83, G14, M41 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I explore a fundamental driver of capital market efficiency – investor attention to information.1 In particular, I 
investigate how investor attention to accounting information influences the pricing of stocks. I focus on the 
attention of individual retail investors, who are known to process information less efficiently and rely more on 
publicly available signals than do institutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2013). I create a novel measure 
of attention to accounting information that mimics individual investors’ Internet search behavior using search 
terms combining a firm indicator (ticker symbol or company name) with words that indicate accounting 
information (e.g., financial reports, sales, and earnings) or other value-relevant information (e.g., price trends 
and products).
2
 When individual-investor attention to accounting information is high, I find that price 
responses to quarterly earnings announcements are more pronounced. However, consistent with predictions 
derived from the analytical model of Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011), although the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) and the profit anomaly are weaker, the accrual anomaly is stronger. The accrual 
anomaly result does not hold for sophisticated-investor attention to accounting information.
3
 Given that 
anomalies indicate capital market inefficiencies, these findings suggest that more acquisition of accounting 
information by individual investors does not guarantee efficient pricing in capital markets. 
Accounting rules require firms to disclose general purpose financial reports that could be useful to a wide 
range of investors (FASB, 2010). Research provides evidence that accounting information in these reports is 
indeed used by various investors but not without biases, which are largely documented in the form of 
underreaction or overreaction to the information (e.g., Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006; Ball and Brown 
1968; Cooper, Gulen, and Schill 2008; Fama and French, 1992, 2006; Sloan, 1996). Not surprisingly, 
however, the strength of these biased reactions can vary both cross-sectionally (Fama and French, 2008; 
                                                          
1 Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) quote Nobel laureate Herbert Simon as follows: ―Information consumes the attention of its recipients, 
and thus a wealth of information creates a need to allocate attention efficiently among the information sources that might consume it.‖ 
2 I rely on Google because it is by far the most popular search engine. For example, comScore report shows that searches powered by 
Google were 65.5% (89% for mobile and tablet searches) as of March, 2015. Google calculates a Search Volume Index (SVI) from its 
search engine and makes it publicly available via Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends). This SVI can serve as a direct and 
timely measure of the attention of individual investors. For example, Da et al. (2011) show that SVI is highly correlated with retail 
trades but not institutional trades and that it is a leading indicator of trading volume. They also find that SVI leads the release of 
chunky news, which indicates that the business press is attentive to the interests of general public represented by individual investors. 
3 Sophisticated investors’ attention to accounting information is measured using the volume of SEC EDGAR traffic for corporate 
filings that contain financial statements (i.e., 10-K/Qs and 8-Ks with Item 5).  
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Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004) and over time (Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong 2014; Green, Hand, and 
Soliman 2011; McLean and Pontiff, 2013; Schwert 2003). It has been suggested that investors’ reaction to 
information is a function of various costs needed to collect and process information (e.g., Mashruwala, 
Rajgopal, and Shevlin 2006; Blankespoor and Zhu 2017) which can be taxing on attentional resources (e.g., 
Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). 
In this study, I consider two potential explanations predicting how investor attention influences their reaction 
to information. More attention could allow investors to collect and process more value-relevant information.
4
 
At the same time, it could provide opportunity for less pertinent information to become more salient. These 
two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Rather, their validities would depend on investor characteristics. 
Based on the theory that the effect of attention on investor reactions to information depends on information 
processing costs (Hirshleifer et al., 2011), I predict that the former applies to sophisticated institutional 
investors while the latter weighs heavier on individual retail investors.
5
 Specifically, I predict that, when 
individual investors pay attention to accounting information, due to higher marginal information processing 
costs, they fixate on the summary earnings number without fully incorporating other value-relevant 
information including the components of earnings, thus alleviating the PEAD and the profit anomaly but 
simultaneously exacerbating the accrual anomaly. 
I begin by documenting the time-series and cross-sectional properties of attention to accounting information 
and search volume in the Google Trends and SEC EDGAR websites, which represent information sources for 
individual investors and sophisticated investors, respectively.
6
 I find that both attention and search-volume 
                                                          
4 Schwert (2003) observes that anomalies tend to disappear, reverse, or weaken after they are documented and analyzed in academic 
literature. For example, positive returns to the hedge portfolio strategy exploiting the accruals anomaly first documented by Sloan 
(1996) no longer hold since 2004 (Green et al. 2011; Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki 2010). Similarly, Johnson and Schwartz (2001) 
find that the strength of the PEAD has decreased after its original documentation by Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990).  
5 Hirshleifer et al. (2011) explore this intuition in a model that illustrates the effect of attention on a set of accounting anomalies. In 
their model, all investors are identical (i.e., risk-averse utility maximizers who update their beliefs as rational Bayesians according to 
the signals they observe), except for their marginal information processing costs, which determine the breadth of information (i.e., all 
publicly available information, a subset of that information, or no earnings-related information) they pay attention to. 
6 My measure of attention to accounting information is different from search volume, which is popularly used in prior literature as a 
proxy for investor attention to firms. Search volume represents the volume of searches for a company name or stock ticker symbol. 
Attention to accounting information is measured as the relative magnitude of accounting information of a firm relative to all 
information that is relevant to the firm’s value. This measurement is consistent with the theory of Kahneman (1973) that limited 
attention creates an allocation problem.  
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variables grow over time at a decreasing rate in my sample from 2004 to 2016. I also find evidence suggesting 
that competitive industries also compete for the attention of individual investors, but not sophisticated 
investors. Both attention to accounting information and search volume exhibit a spike on the day of various 
information events, with merger and acquisition announcements generating the strongest search-volume 
response by both individual and sophisticated investors.
7
 Attention to accounting information by individual 
investors and sophisticated investors, however, responds most strongly to management earnings guidance and 
earnings announcements, respectively. Multivariate regressions show consistent results.  
Next, I investigate the influence of attention to accounting information and search volume on investors’ 
responses to earnings news. This investigation is important because a necessary condition for my hypotheses 
to hold is that investors respond more to earnings when they pay more attention to accounting information. I 
find that the three-day abnormal stock returns around quarterly earnings announcements are stronger when 
there is greater individual-investor attention to accounting information, such that a one standard deviation 
increase in abnormal attention is associated with a 31.2% stronger response to earnings news. This result 
holds even after controlling for sophisticated-investor attention. However, I fail to find economically or 
statistically significant results for search volume, which is the measure of attention used in prior studies (e.g., 
Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 2012).  
My final investigation tests hypotheses by examining capital market anomalies, measured by abnormal stock 
returns to long-short hedge portfolios sorted on extreme-quintile anomaly variables. Consistent with my 
hypotheses derived from Hirshleifer et al. (2011), I find that, when there is more individual-investor attention, 
the accrual anomaly is stronger, and the PEAD and the profit anomaly are weaker. For example, although the 
accrual anomaly disappeared before the start of my sample period, it remains positive and significant in 
subsamples of stock in which attention to accounting information by individual investors is high. Similarly, 
the PEAD is economically and statistically significant only when the abnormal attention to accounting 
information is low at the time of the announcement, and this underreaction can be corrected over time if 
                                                          
7 Following Drake et al. (2009), I examine quarterly earnings announcements, analyst quarterly earnings forecasts, management 
quarterly earnings guidance, dividend announcements, and merger and acquisition announcements.   
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attention is high afterward. These results hold after controlling for alternative explanations, such as 
institutional ownership, firm size, and investor sentiment. For example, although the profit anomaly does not 
hold when institutional ownership is high, it is positive and significant in subsamples of stock with low 
attention to accounting information. The results for the PEAD and the profit anomaly also hold, albeit with 
less significance, for sophisticated-investor attention. However, the results for the accrual anomaly are of the 
opposite sign, lack economic and statistical significance, or both, which indicates that limited attention is less 
of a problem for sophisticated investors.  
This study spans several areas of capital market research. First, it contributes to the stream of research 
attempting to find the determinants of capital market efficiency (e.g., Chordia et al. 2012; Stambaugh, Yu, 
and Yuan 2012) by developing a firm-specific measure of individual investors’ attention to fundamental 
accounting information. Using this measure, I provide empirical evidence illuminating the variation in price 
efficiency that was not explained by investors’ general attention to firms’ stock (Drake et al. 2012). My 
measure is motivated by the theoretical literature that singles out investor attention determined by information 
processing costs as a rational explanation for trading behavior that is commonly interpreted as biased 
reactions (e.g., Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer et al. 2011). My findings also comport with research that 
explores the influence of individual investor attention on the pricing of information in stock markets (e.g., Da 
et al. 2011; Lawrence, Ryans, Sun, and Laptev 2016, 2018). 
Second, this study pertains to the ongoing debate on whether and how retail trades contribute to stock prices 
(e.g., Barber and Odean 2013; Barrot, Kaniel, and Sraer 2016; Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman 2008; Kaniel, 
Ron, Saar, and Titman 2012; Kelley and Tetlock 2013; Linnainmaa 2010) by showing that, even if individual 
investors do heed value-relevant information and thus do not completely trade on noise (Black 1986; Shleifer 
and Summers 1990), their use of information can push prices away from fundamentals (Barber, Odean, and 
Zhu 2009). This finding offers an alternative perspective to the emerging literature on the role of the Internet 
as an information intermediary in capital markets (e.g., Blankespoor, Miller, and White 2013), by providing 
evidence that the plethora of information made publicly available and easily assessable may have a limited 
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role in promoting efficient trading of nonprofessional investors, due to their insufficient resources for 
selecting and utilizing the information (Barber and Odean 2008). 
Third, this study contributes to the literature examining the informativeness of historical accounting 
information (e.g., Ball 2013; Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 2015) and responds to the call for research that 
aims to understand the usefulness of public accounting from users’ perspectives (Lev 1989). In particular, my 
findings provide incremental insights to the literature, by showing that demand for information does not 
guarantee its efficient use. This final point closely relates to the objective of the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8 issued by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) as a 
guideline for setting accounting standards that generate general-purpose financial statements for a wide range 
of investors (explicitly defined as current and potential shareholders and creditors). Given that institutional 
investors have timelier and more sophisticated private sources of information, the investors who could benefit 
most from public financial reports are individuals (Ben-Rephael, Da, Easton, and Israelsen 2017; 
Blankespoor, deHaan, Wertz, and Zhu 2018). The implications of this study suggest that this is not 
necessarily the case and thereby raise the question of whether it should be. I leave the exploration of this 
question for future research. 
An important contribution of this study is proposing a new measure of attention that is less plagued by 
measurement error. As deHaan, Lawrence, and Litjens (2018) contend and my empirical tests suggest, the 
search volume of ticker symbols on Google does not necessarily capture the attention to financial information 
paid by investors for investment purposes. By using search terms that combine firm indicators with words that 
indicate specific types of information, my measure unambiguously captures the attention that investors 
allocate to accounting information relative to other value-relevant information. More generally, my approach 
can be useful for future studies that aim to explore the attention to various types of firm-specific information. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theory and develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data and research design. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Limited attention has been conjectured as one of the primary sources of misvaluation (e.g., Barber and Odean 
2008; Da et al. 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2011). Empirical studies support the notion that limited attention is a 
distinct feature of the trading behavior of individual investors.
8 
For example, Barber and Odean (2008) show 
that individual investors exhibit attention-driven behavior while institutional investors do not. Subsequent 
studies document that such behavior by individual investors can affect stock prices. For example, attention-
driven behavior is associated with initial stock price overreaction and subsequent reversals that are unrelated 
to firm fundamentals (Mayer 2014). This effect is particularly prominent in small trades that are likely 
initiated by individual investors (Da et al. 2011). In addition, research suggests that individual investors’ 
limited attention might be responsible for some empirical findings, such as anomalies being stronger among 
stocks with lower ownership by active institutional investors (e.g., Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 2000; 
Collins, Gong, and Hribar 2003) and the significant spike in stock prices and subsequent reversals around 
earnings announcements being correlated with trades by small investors but not with those by medium or 
large traders (Aboody, Lehavy, and Trueman 2010). 
Such observable inefficiencies in individual investors’ trading might be driven by the lack of information, the 
lack of resources to process the information, or a combination of the two. It is not obvious, therefore, whether 
more attention to value-relevant information would attenuate or exacerbate anomalies. More attention might 
increase the breadth of information collected and processed, leading to better decision-making. If the 
anomalies arise from the lack of information, then more attention would make them weaker.
9
 At the same 
time, more attention might intensify anomalies because, as investors attempt to analyze and interpret more 
information, their biases take hold due to constraints in resources such as time and knowledge (i.e., 
information processing costs). If the anomalies stem from high information processing costs that result in 
                                                          
8 The attention of individual investors is more limited than that of institutional investors due to restrictions on their time, technology, 
and expertise (Barber and Odean 2008). Since individual investors also have tighter financial constraints, attention-driven behavior 
tend to be concentrated in small trades (Da et al. 2011). However, as Barrot, Kaniel, and Sraer (2016) point out, while retail investors 
are possibly less sophisticated then their institutional counterparts, they also face lower agency costs and liquidity constraints 
(Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Coval and Stafford 2007), which in turn grant them some ability to act as market makers. 
9 Research finds that the reaction is weaker and the drift is stronger when earnings are announced on low-attention periods, such as 
Fridays (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009), after trading hours (Bagnoli et al. 2005), on the same day as a large number of other earnings 
announcements (Hirshleifer et al. 2009), or when there is less accounting-related discussion (Lerman 2011).  
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inefficient trading, then more attention would strengthen the anomalies. The directional prediction of the 
effect of attention to value-relevant information on an anomaly, therefore, would depend on the type of 
investor and the type of anomaly. For institutional investors, it is reasonable to expect that the former 
hypotheses would be supported for all anomalies. For individual investors, the directional effect is less clear.  
I predict that individual investors’ attention to accounting information would alleviate anomalies based on 
easy-to-process information but exacerbate those based on more difficult-to-process information. My 
prediction is based on the analytical model of Hirshleifer et al. (2011) in which attentional constraints 
becomes the single factor that comprehensively explains various earnings-based anomalies.
10
 In this model, 
some investor groups choose to trade on their uninformed expectations, due to the high expected costs 
incurred by (i) being attentive to and collecting information or (ii) being attentive to and analyzing the 
properties or detailed components of the information. Based on these information processing costs, the model 
divides investors into three groups: investors that trade on noise, investors that fixate on earnings, and 
investors that use all public information (i.e., earnings and its components). The model shows that, when the 
influence of the second group becomes significantly larger than the first, the PEAD and profit anomaly 
becomes weaker but concurrently the accrual anomaly becomes stronger.
11
 I argue that individual investors 
represent the first two groups while institutional investors represent the last. 
Advances in information technology, such as internet search engines, have made the former costs (i.e., cost (i)) 
relatively equal among individual and institutional investors compared to the latter costs (i.e., cost (ii)), which 
                                                          
10 Hirshleifer et al. (2011) suggests that limited attention is responsible for well-known anomalies such as the post-earnings accounting 
drift (PEAD) (Ball and Brown 1968; Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Francis, Pagach, and Stephan 
1992; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009), the accrual anomaly (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2000; Fedyk, Singer, and Sougiannis 
2010; Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh 2012; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna 2005; Sloan 1996; Teoh and Wong 2002), and, more 
recently, the profit anomaly (Balakrishnan, Bartov, and Faurel 2010; Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang 2010). 
11 In the model, different groups of investors attend to different earnings-related signals, based on their information processing costs to 
form valuations of the firm, which in the aggregate affect stock prices. Some investor groups neglect earnings, while others attend to 
them but neglect the components (i.e., accruals and cash flows). Some investors even ignore earnings altogether. Since the accrual 
component of earnings is a stronger predictor of future earnings than the cash flow component of earnings (                     
         ), if the fraction of investors fixating on earnings rather than its components ( 
 ) is sufficiently larger than the fraction of 
investors ignoring earnings (  ), regardless of the fraction of investors analyzing earnings components (          ), the 
underreaction to earnings is attenuated at the cost of an overreaction to the accrual component of earnings. Thus       becomes a 
necessary condition for the accrual anomaly, in addition to the condition originally proposed by Sloan (1996) (i.e.,            
         ). The model also shows that the profit anomaly is generated due to investors neglecting the ability of current earnings to 
predict future earnings, even after controlling for earnings surprise, and that both the profit anomaly and PEAD are attenuated when 
investors pay more attention to current earnings, rather than hold on to their prior earnings expectations. 
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could vary significantly based on such investor characteristics as ability, experience, education, time, and 
money. Consequently, when individual investors move away from noise trading and do pay attention to 
information, they are more likely to place their focus on representative summary numbers instead of 
analyzing its properties and components (e.g., Bonner, Walther, and Young 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that individual investors would belong to the investor group in the Hirshleifer et al. (2011) model 
that fixates on earnings, rather than decompose earnings into accruals and cash flows when they do allocate 
attention to accounting information. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses.  
H1: The PEAD is weaker when individual investors pay more attention to accounting information. 
H2: The profit anomaly is weaker when individual investors pay more attention to accounting information. 
H3: The accrual anomaly is stronger when individual investors pay more attention to accounting information. 
3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Proxies for Individual Investors’ Attention to Accounting Information 
A challenge in testing my hypotheses is obtaining a direct measure of individual investor attention on 
information. I follow Da et al. (2011), who uses the search frequency of firms’ ticker symbols or company 
names in Google as a proxy for individual investor attention on firms.
12
 However, while a firm indicator as a 
search term would capture the general attention to a firm or its stock, it does not show which firm-specific 
information is being paid attention to. Therefore, I create search terms by combining the firm indicators with 
words that indicate either accounting information on firm fundamentals, such as report, revenue, profit, and 
earnings, or other value-relevant information, such as stock, share, price, and finance.
13
 I refer to the former as 
accounting information and the latter as non-accounting information. The combination of one out of two 
different firm indicators and one out of 32 different information indicators create a set of 64 different 
                                                          
12 Consistent with the notion that individual investors rely more heavily on information from the Internet than do institutional 
investors, who likely have more sophisticated private sources, Da et al. (2011) find that the correlation between the search frequency 
in Google and returns is economically and statistically significant for small trades but not for large ones. 
13 These words were selected based on relevance and availability. To ensure the availability of a relevant word, I combine it with 
indicators of popular companies, such as Apple Inc. and Google Inc. Words are not included in the final word list if there is zero 
search volume for these companies, as it is unlikely that there would be more searches of these words for less popular companies. 
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combined search terms for each firm, which are used collectively to create a single firm-specific measure of 
attention to accounting. 
My data preparation begins with collecting the search volume index (SVI) from the Google Trends website on 
a daily basis using the combined search terms.
14
 Since Google Trends only allows manual downloading of 
daily SVI data, I scrape the data by feeding relevant search terms and compilation intervals into an algorithm 
that mimics a human using a mouse and keyboard. I manipulate the parameters so that data is collected for 
any search that contains both a firm indicator (i.e., a ticker symbol or company name) and an information 
indicator (i.e., a word that is used to search accounting or other value-relevant information) in the search 
term.
15,16
 For example, a search term that combines the ticker symbol of Apple Inc. (i.e., aapl) as the firm 
indicator and the word ―report‖ as the information indicator, which would capture search volume for ―aapl 
corporate report,‖ ―aapl financial report,‖ ―aapl annual report,‖ ―aapl quarterly report,‖ etc. Information 
indicators are selected from a list of words that generate nonzero search volume in Google Trends when 
combined with firm indicators. Each SVI is further aggregated into summary measures of SVI based on 
accounting words (      ) and SVI based on non-accounting words (        ). Google outputs using 
examples of combined search terms are displayed in Figure 1. 
Since resource constraints require investors to allocate their attention among various types of information 
(Kahneman 1973), I measure the level of attention allocated to accounting information (  ) (henceforth, 
―attention‖) as follows. 
          
          
                          
    
                                                          
14 SVIs for the same search term might be slightly different depending on the times they were downloaded because Google Trends 
calculates SVI from a random subset of the actual historical data by dividing each data point by the total searches of the geography 
and time range it represents to compare relative popularity. The resulting numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100, based on the 
topic’s proportion to all searches on all topics. When downloaded several times, however, Da et al. (2011) find that the correlations 
among the SVIs are above 97%, which means that the sampling error is small on average and would only work against finding results. 
15 Google Trends outputs different SVI results, depending on how the search term is defined. For example, let {tennis, shoes} be the 
set of possible words inputted into Google’s search bar denoted as ||. The search term |tennis shoes| outputs searches containing both 
words in any order but can also include other words. The search term |―tennis shoes‖| outputs searches containing the exact phrase 
inside the double quotation marks, possibly with words before or after. The search term |tennis + shoes| outputs searches containing 
the words tennis or shoes. The search term |tennis – shoes| outputs searches containing the word tennis without the word shoes. 
16 Searches of company names may represent information demand of customers rather than investors. This concern, however, is 
mitigated by combining the company name with an information indicator.  
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where, for firm   on day  ,        is the search volume for accounting information, and           is the 
search volume for non-accounting value-relevant information. I further calculate the abnormal level of 
attention (   ) by subtracting the average    for the same day of the week over prior 10 weeks.17 I repeat 
this process using ticker symbols (     ) and company names (     ) as firm indicators. Given that 
investors can use either ticker symbols or company names to search for firms, excluding the name-based SVI 
would result in omitting a significant portion of attention that investors allocate to firm-specific information. 
Therefore, I use the average of       and       as the main measure of attention to accounting information 
(  ). As a result, I create a SVI dataset of 18,875,521 firm-day observations (corresponding to 4,146 U.S. 
public firms) of attention to firm-specific information from January 1, 2004 (i.e., the first date that Google 
Trends data is available) to December 31, 2016. The detailed definition of each attention and search-volume 
variable is listed in Table 1 Panel A. 
3.2 Sample Construction 
The SVI dataset is merged with the SEC EDGAR search traffic dataset (explained in Section 3.5), Quarterly 
Compustat, I/B/E/S, Thompson Reuters, SDC Platinum, and CRSP databases to create the final samples. 
Three types of samples with different time intervals are used for the empirical tests – daily, event, and 
monthly. The daily sample is used for investigating the determinants of investor attention. The event sample 
is used for the event study on the effects of investor attention on responses to earnings announcements. The 
monthly sample is used for the constructing hedge portfolios sorted on anomaly variables and attention 
variables. For the event sample and the monthly sample, attention and search-volume variables are aggregated 
to match relevant time intervals. For Quarterly Compustat, I require that all firm-quarter observations have 
nonnegative assets and sales. For Daily and Monthly CRSP, I exclude ADRs, shares of beneficial interest, 
units, stocks of firms incorporated outside the United States, Americus Trust components, closed-end funds, 
preferred stocks, and REITs as they likely differ from ordinary equities. Observations are deleted from the 
                                                          
17       =      
 
   
 ∑         
  
   , where      and       are the attention and the abnormal level of attention, respectively, 
for firm   on day  . The same process is used to create measures of abnormal search volume for firm-specific information (     , 
except for the fact that it is normalized as the natural log of (100+    ). 
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samples if an attention or search-volume variable (defined in Table 1 Panel A), and earnings-announcement 
or anomaly variable (defined in Table 1 Panel B), or a control or determinant variable (defined in Table 1 
Panel C) is missing. This process leaves me with three final samples of 8,576,855 firm-day and 86,810 firm-
event observations from 2004 to 2016 and 387,084 firm-month observations from 2004 to 2015.
18
  
3.3 Event Studies at Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
An important necessary condition for my hypotheses is that investors’ response to earnings increases with 
their attention. To investigate whether this condition holds, I perform an event study around quarterly 
earnings announcements using the following regression model.   
  [     ]                          [     ]           [     ]    
               [     ]                    [     ]     
                             ∑             
 
      ∑                      
 
                                                (1) 
where, for firm   in quarter      [     ] is the cumulative abnormal returns,     [     ] is the 
cumulative abnormal search volume for the firm indicator, and    [     ] is the average abnormal 
attention from one day before to one day after the earnings announcement, and    is the earnings surprise. 
Control variables are earnings volatility (    ), analyst following (      ), institutional ownership 
(   ), incidence of manager earnings guidance (     ), rank of size (    ), rank of book-to-market ratio 
(   ), stock turnover (    ), fourth quarter indicator (  ), and number of other earnings announcements 
on the same day (     ). The detailed definition of each control variable is in Table 1 Panel C.  
The coefficient of interest in regression (1) is   . When abnormal returns (  [     ]) is the dependent 
variable,    > 0 indicates that the price response to earnings news is stronger when individual investors pay 
more attention to accounting information.  
3.4 Long-Short Hedge Portfolio Strategies 
                                                          
18 The SEC EDGAR search traffic data (Ryans, 2018) is available up to June 30, 2016, which limits the periods of my samples. Since 
the investor sentiment dataset by Baker and Wurgler (2006) is available up to September 2015, the inclusion of this variable further 
limits the periods of my sample to the period from 2004 to 2015. 
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My main empirical investigation involves testing whether earnings-based anomalies are alleviated or 
exacerbated with the increase of attention. Following the theory of Hirshleifer et al. (2011), the anomalies 
considered in this study are the PEAD (Ball and Brown 1968; Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990), the profit 
anomaly (Fama and French 1992, 2006; Haugen and Baker 1996; Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho 2002) 
and the accrual anomaly (Sloan 1996). For each anomaly, I construct long-short strategies by taking a long 
position on the highest-performing quintile and a short position on the lowest-performing quintile. Within 
each long and short position, I classify each stock as either high- or low-attention based on whether       is 
above or below the monthly cross-sectional median. I then compare the equal-weighted abnormal returns to 
the long-short strategy for high- and low-attention stocks. Abnormal returns are computed as the Fama-
French three-factor adjusted returns.
19
 The detailed definition of each anomaly variable is in Table 1 Panel B. 
To rule out alternative explanations, I construct additional sorts based on firm size, institutional ownership, 
and investor sentiment. I also use the following regression model. 
                                                    
         
            
    
             
    
                                              
where     is the stock returns for firm   in month        is the risk-free rate,    is an indicator equal to one 
if attention is low and zero otherwise,    is an indicator equal to one if attention is high and zero otherwise, 
        is an indicator equals to one if market capitalization is above 50th percentile of NYSE stocks and 
zero otherwise,        is an indicator equals to one if institutional ownership is high and zero otherwise, 
                                                          
19 According to Fama and French (2008), factor-adjusted returns are equivalent to the alphas from regressions of excess returns on 
factor premiums. Therefore the abnormal returns for firms with high or low attention would be comparable to the coeffients on the 
high- and low-attention indicators in the following regression model. 
                                                                                                       
where     is the stock returns for firm   in month        is the risk-free rate,       is and indicator variable equal to 1 if there is 
high attention to information (      and zero otherwise,       is and indicator variable equal to 1 if there is low attention to 
information (      and zero otherwise, and    ,       and     are market, size, and book-to-market premiums, respectively.  
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         is an indicator equal to one if investor sentiment by Baker and Wurgler (2006) is high and zero 
otherwise, and    ,       and      are market, size, and book-to-market premiums, respectively.
20
  
The coefficients of interest in regression (2) are    and   . H1 and H2 predict    >   .  for long-short 
portfolios sorted on standardized unexpected earnings (   ) and profitability (    . H3 predicts    <   .  
for long-short portfolios sorted on accruals (   ). 
3.5 Analysis of Individual versus Sophisticated Investor Attention to Accounting Information 
Research finds that the attention of individuals in the aggregate affects the behavior of institutional investors. 
Specifically, Da et al. (2011) find that individual investors’ attention is a lead indicator of chunky news, 
which in turn attracts the attention of institutional investors and consequently influences their trading.
21
 If this 
is the case, it is important to control for the sophisticated investors’ attention in tests of individual investors’ 
attention. It is also important to question whether sophisticated investors’ attention has the same effect on 
stock prices as does individual investors’ attention. Arguably, H1and H2 can be predicted for sophisticated 
investors as well, especially because the business media tends to emphasize earnings rather than its 
components, which could amplify the response to the earnings number by both individual and institutional 
investors (Hirshleifer et al. 2011). However, given the evidence that sophisticated investors discern the 
properties of earnings components (Green et al. 2011), H3 likely does not hold.  
To compare and control for sophisticated investors’ attention, I use the SEC EDGAR search traffic data 
because it is reasonable to expect that sophisticated investors would directly search for corporate filings, 
rather than Google financial information. First, for each firm, I aggregate the daily number of searches for 
documents that contain financial statements (      ), namely, 10-K/Qs and 8-Ks that include Item 5. The 
number of searches for all other documents (        ) are aggregated separately. Next, I create a measure for 
sophisticated investors’ attention (  ) by dividing         by the total number of searches for the firm’s 
                                                          
20 High/low levels are determined by whether the monthly average is above/below the median. Size breakpoints are determined using 
market cap for NYSE stocks as in Fama and French (2008). 
21 Chunky news is ―stories consisting of more newswire messages and are more likely to be timely, important, and thorough.‖ (Tetlock 
2010). 
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documents (i.e.,        plus         ). I also create measures for abnormal attention (    and     ), using 
the same process that creates     and      (explained in Section 3.1). As a result, I create a SEC EDGAR 
search traffic dataset of 39,424,081 firm-day observations (corresponding to 25,267 U.S. public firms) of 
attention to firm-specific documents filed with the SEC from January 1, 2004, to June 31, 2016 (i.e., the last 
date that EDGAR search traffic data is available), which is merged with other necessary datasets for this study. 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.1 Time-Series and Cross-Sectional Statistics  
Figure 2 displays the daily averages of abnormal search volume (i.e.,      and      before log-
transformation) and abnormal attention (i.e.,     and    ) for the 60-day period before and after various 
information event dates for firms in the final sample from 2004 to 2016. The information events that I 
examine are quarterly earnings announcements, analyst quarterly earnings forecasts, management quarterly 
earnings guidance, management quarterly non-earnings guidance (untabulated), dividend announcements 
(untabulated), and merger and acquisition announcements. The graphs show that      and      and respond 
most strongly to merger and acquisition announcements (30.0 and 36.7, respectively) on the day of the 
announcement.      and      also respond strongly to management quarterly earnings guidance (11.6 and 
12.6, respectively), management quarterly non-earnings guidance (untabulated), and quarterly earnings 
announcements (10.3 and 15.5, respectively). Although analyst quarterly earnings forecasts and dividend 
announcements (untabulated) do elicit some abnormal search volume, the magnitudes are very small 
compared to those shown in the aforementioned events.  
The highest increase in abnormal individual-investor attention (i.e.,    ) is generated on management 
quarterly earnings guidance dates (0.026), followed by quarterly earnings announcement dates (0.018). While 
abnormal sophisticated-investor attention (i.e.,    ) also increases when management releases quarterly 
earnings guidance (0.069), it increases most when there is a quarterly earnings announcement (0.097). 
    and     also respond to analyst quarterly earnings forecasts and dividend announcements (untabulated), 
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albeit in much smaller magnitudes. However,     and     do not spike around merger and acquisition 
announcements. Instead, when there is a merger and acquisition,     shows seemingly random fluctuations 
before and after the announcement and     shows a significant decrease (-0.076) on the day of the 
announcement. This finding is interesting because merger and acquisition announcements elicit the strongest 
abnormal increase in search volume (i.e.,      and     ).  
Untabulated results examining cross-sectional averages show that the industries in which    ,    ,   , and 
   are the highest and lowest are different. An interesting finding is that the industries with the lower levels 
of     and    are most populated (i.e., high-tech and finance), which suggests that firms are vying for the 
limited attention of individual investors in competitive industries and that individual investors’ attention 
might be concentrated on a few popular firms. The opposite is true for     and    in the most concentrated 
industries (i.e., durable goods and chemicals). However, this contrast between competitive versus 
concentrated industries is weaker for     and   , which indicates that sophisticated investors’ attention is 
more evenly distributed. In addition, the inter-industry standard deviation of    is 34.36% of its industry 
mean, which is more than three times larger than that of    (9.45%), which means that individual investors 
tend to follow firms in certain industries more than others while sophisticated investors do not. Industry-
specific plots of monthly average    and    reveal that, while the average   s of different industries 
fluctuate together, the movements of industry-average   s are not particularly synchronized over time. 
4.2 Univariate Statistics, Pairwise Correlations, and Determinants 
Table 2 reports the univariate statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables used in the empirical tests.
 
Statistics and correlations in Panels A, B, and C are created from observations in the daily sample, the 
quarterly earnings announcement sample (henceforth, event sample), and the monthly sample, respectively.
22 
 
Panel A shows that the daily mean and standard deviation of     are 54.48 and 27.72, respectively, which 
results in a standard deviation that is 50.9% of the mean. For   , this ratio is 176.7%, which is more than four 
                                                          
22 The daily and event sample is from 2004 to 2016. The monthly sample is from 2004 to 2015 due to the availability of the Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment data.   
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times higher than the ratio for    . The corresponding ratios for     and   , respectively, are 142.8% and 
68.7%. Pairwise correlations show that the correlations are relatively low between Google- and EDGAR-
based variables (i.e.,     and    ,    and   ). Panel B shows that the standard deviations of abnormal 
search volume and attention around quarterly earnings announcements, compared to their respective means, 
are as much as ten times larger than those observed in the daily sample. The statistics of the control variables 
in the event sample are comparable to those in the daily sample. Panel C shows that the monthly statistics of 
search-volume (i.e.,     and    ) and attention (i.e.,    and   ) variables are also comparable to their daily 
statistics.  
Table 3 presents the regression results of search-volume and attention variables on their hypothesized 
determinants. For all search-volume variables, merger and acquisition announcements (     ) is the 
strongest determinant, with     and     being higher by 12.6% (21.4%) and 312.1% (600.9%) on the day of 
(during the two days on and after) the announcement.
23
 In contrast, merger and acquisition announcements 
have negative or insignificant influence on the attention variables. Instead, quarterly earnings announcements 
(    ) elicit the highest to third highest responses, with    and    being higher by 15.7% (19.6%) and 
16.3% (32.5%) on (during the two days on and after) the announcement. Interestingly, however, dividend 
announcements (      ) (28.7%) and management quarterly earnings guidance (        ) (30.3%) have a 
stronger effect on    than do quarterly earnings announcements. In addition, on analyst forecast dates 
(        ), there is a significant increase in search volume (i.e.,     and    ) and sophisticated-investor 
attention      but no statistically or economically significant change in individual-investor attention     .  
Among the hypothesized determinants besides event dates, analyst following (      ) imposes the 
strongest influence on     and   , with a standard deviation increase in the former associated with the latter 
variables increasing 19.6% and 11.8%, respectively. Interestingly, while institutional ownership (   ) has 
some positive association with     (9.8%), its influence on     is negative (-46.9%). A potential explanation 
                                                          
23 Drake et al. (2012) also find the corporate information event that has the highest association with abnormal searches for the firm is 
merger and acquisition announcements. Earnings announcements have the second highest association with abnormal search volume, 
followed by management forecasts, analyst forecasts, and dividend announcements. 
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is that, when the percentage of institutional ownership is high, the search for corporate filings are executed by 
fewer sophisticated investors, thus decreasing the search traffic on the EDGAR website. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, stock returns (      ) are positively associated with individual-investor search volume (     
but not associated with attention (i.e.,    and   ). In addition, while a move up in size rank (       ) 
increases both search volume and attention, a move up in book-to-market ratio rank (      ) decreases 
EDGAR-based variables (i.e.,     and   ) but increases Google-based variables (i.e.,     and   ), which 
suggests that sophisticated investors are more future oriented than individual investors.
24
  
4.3 Event Studies at Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the three-day abnormal stock returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements (  [     ]) on abnormal search-volume (i.e.,     [     ] and     [     ]) or 
attention (i.e.,    [     ] and    [     ]) variables interacted with earnings news, measured as the 
quarterly earnings amount exceeding either consensus analyst quarterly earnings forecasts (   ) or prior-
year’s quarterly earnings of the same quarter (   ). Panel A shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
   [     ] is associated with a 7.1% higher response to each unit of    . Similarly, the response to each 
unit of     is higher by 31.2% with each standard deviation increase in    [     ]. As for    [     ], 
the coefficients on its interactions with both     and     are positive but smaller economically and fail to 
show statistical significance in most specifications. Contrary to Drake et al. (2012), I do find positive 
coefficients on interactions of abnormal search-volume variables and quarterly earnings news. However, the 
economic and statistical significances are not large enough to warrant empirical inferences.  
Table 4 Panel B presents the regression results, including both Google- (i.e.,     and   ) and EDGAR-based 
variables (i.e.,     and   ) to control for the potential influence of sophisticated investors when drawing 
inferences about the impact of individual investors’ attention. The findings are consistent with the results in 
                                                          
24 Untabulated results of regressions including investor sentiment as an independent variable (in a subsample from 2004 to 2015) 
reveal that search volume (i.e.,     and    ) is positively correlated with investor sentiment, while attention (i.e.,    and      is not. 
This finding is consistent with the idea that much of individual investors’ attention is sentiment-driven (e.g., Stambaugh et al. 2012) 
but not their attention to accounting information. 
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Panel A. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in     [     ] is associated with a higher response 
to each unit of     and     by 4.6% and 21.0%, respectively. The coefficients on    [     ] interacted 
with     and     are positive but lack statistical significance. In addition, coeffients on abnormal search-
volume variables (i.e.,     [     ] and     [     ]) interacted with quarterly earnings news remain 
largely unchanged. These findings indicate that the strength of the price reaction to earnings news varies with 
the attention by individual investors even after controlling for the attention by sophisticated investors. 
4.4 Long-Short Hedge Portfolio Strategies 
Table 5 presents the monthly means of abnormal returns for long-short hedge portfolios double sorted on 
extreme-quintile anomaly variables and high/low attention in the final sample from 2004 to 2015.
25
 Portfolios 
are sorted at the beginning of each month. Abnormal returns are calculated as the monthly stock returns in 
excess of the returns in stock portfolios matched on size and book-to-market ratio. In my sample, the 
abnormal returns for long-short hedge portfolios sorted on profitability (   ) and standardized unexpected 
earnings (   ) are 42 and 50 basis points, respectively, which represent the profit anomaly and the PEAD, 
respectively. The abnormal returns for long-short portfolios sorted on accounting accruals (   ), which 
represents the accrual anomaly, is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with research 
documenting that the accrual anomaly had disappeared after 2004 (e.g., Green et al. 2011), which coincides 
with the starting year of my sample.  
However, in additional sorts by high/low attention, I do find evidence of the accrual anomaly. Specifically, 
consistent with H3, I find that the accrual anomaly is positive and statistically significant when    is high, 
generating abnormal returns of 24 basis points, but negative or insignificant when    is low. On the contrary, 
consistent with H1 and H2, I find that the PEAD and the profitability anomaly are weaker under high levels of 
   than under low levels. The same patterns hold in subsamples of high versus low levels of    for the 
                                                          
25 I limit the sample to 2015 due to the availability of the investor sentiment data by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which serves as a 
control variable in Tables 8 and 9. 
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PEAD and the profit anomaly but not for the accrual anomaly. These findings indicate that, while individual 
investors on average overreact to high-accrual stocks by fixating on earnings, sophisticated investors do not. 
Table 6 presents the monthly means of abnormal returns for long-short hedge portfolios sorted on extreme-
quintile anomaly variables, high/low attention, and alternative explanations for the variation in the strength of 
anomalies, which are institutional ownership (   ), market capitalization (    ), and investor sentiment 
(    ).26 Portfolios are sorted at the beginning of each month. Consistent with prior research, I find that 
abnormal returns to     and     portfolios are highly positive and significant only when    is low, 
     is small, and      is high. Abnormal returns to     portfolios are statistically and economically 
insignificant regardless of   ,     , and     .  
However, in additional sorts by high/low attention, I find patterns similar to those documented in Table 5, 
regardless of   ,     , and     . For example, consistent with H3, I find that the accrual anomaly is 
positive and statistically significant when    is high regardless of     , with abnormal returns of 28 and 41 
basis points for large- and small/micro-     portfolios, respectively. The abnormal returns remain negative 
and insignificant when    is low. In addition, consistent with H1 and H2, I find that PEAD and the 
profitability anomaly are positive and significant even when      is large when    is low. Again, the same 
patterns hold in subsamples of high versus low levels of    for PEAD and the profit anomaly but not for the 
accrual anomaly. These findings lends me confidence that my empirical findings are not attributable to 
institutional ownership, market capitalization or investor sentiment. 
Table 7 presents the alphas in regressions of monthly stock returns on Fama-French three-factors, a high 
indicator (  ) and a low indicator (  ) of attention (i.e.,    or   ), and alternative explanations (i.e., 
       ,        , and         ) for long-short hedge portfolios sorted on an extreme-quintile anomaly 
variable (i.e.,    ,    , or    ). This regression specification provides empirical evidence that 
                                                          
26 The Baker and Wurgler (2006) investor sentiment index is based on first principal component of five (standardized) sentiment 
proxies where each of the proxies has first been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic indicators. The five proxies for 
sentiment are dividend premiums, first-day returns on IPOs, IPO volume, closed-end fund discount, and new equity-share issues. The 
macroeconomic indicators are an industrial production index, nominal durables consumption, nominal nondurables consumption, 
nominal services consumption, NBER recession indicator, employment, and consumer price index. 
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complements the comparisons of means in Tables 7 and 8 (Fama and French, 2008). The coefficients on the 
high and low attention indicators represent the abnormal anomaly returns (henceforth, alphas) to long-short 
hedge portfolios for stocks with high and low attention, respectively.  
Consistent with H3,     alphas are positive in high-   subsamples but mostly negative or economically 
insignificant in low-   subsamples. The resulting positive differences in alphas between high-low 
   subsamples remain statistically and economically significant even after controlling for alternative 
explanations. On the contrary, consistent with H1 and H2,     and     alphas are higher when    is low, 
generating negative differences in alphas between high-low    subsamples, albeit not statistically significant 
for     alphas. The above results in high- versus low-   subsamples do not hold in high- versus low-   
subsamples for     alphas but do hold for     and     alphas. These findings are consistent with the 
findings in Tables 7 and 8 and thus reinforce the robustness of my empirical inferences. 
4.5 Long-Short Hedge Portfolio Returns around Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
In Table 8, I further investigate the abnormal returns around future quarterly earnings announcements for 
    portfolios of stock with high versus low abnormal attention around current quarterly earnings 
announcements. This empirical approach is based on the research of Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) 
documenting that the underreaction to earnings news is corrected when future earnings are announced 
because investors underreact to the autocorrelation properties of seasonal differences in quarterly earnings. 
Consistent with Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), I first document that the abnormal returns to hedge 
portfolios sorted on extreme     are positive around earnings announcements of three subsequent quarters 
but negative around the earnings announcement of the fourth subsequent quarter. The future abnormal returns 
are statistically and economically insignificant, which is consistent with the finding of Johnson and Schwartz 
(2001) that the PEAD became weaker after its discovery. 
However, Table 8 Panel A shows that, when there is low abnormal attention around quarterly earnings 
announcements, the abnormal returns around future announcements become statistically and economically 
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significant. This finding provides further empirical evidence in support of H1. Furthermore, Panel B shows 
that, for stocks with low abnormal attention around quarterly earnings announcements, the abnormal returns 
around future earnings announcements only hold when attention is low during the post-announcement period 
(i.e., from the month after the earnings announcement to the month before the future earnings announcement). 
These findings indicate that the underreaction to earnings news is exacerbated when the attention is low at the 
time of the announcement, but that this underreaction can be corrected before future earnings are announced if 
attention to accounting information is high after the announcement.  
In Table 9, I investigate the abnormal returns after quarterly earnings announcements for     and     
portfolios of stock with high versus low abnormal attention around quarterly earnings announcements. Panel 
A shows that the abnormal returns to     (   ) portfolios during the three-month period after the 
announcement are positive and significant only when the abnormal attention is high (low) around earnings 
announcements. This finding provides further evidence in support of H2 and H3. Furthermore, Panel B shows 
that, for stocks with high (low) abnormal attention around earnings announcements, the abnormal returns for  
    (   ) portfolios are more positive and significant when there is high (low) attention in the previous 
month. For     portfolios, however, the results hold only for individual investors. These findings indicate 
that both individual and sophisticated investors underreact to earnings when their attention is low, but this 
underreaction can be corrected earlier if more attention is paid. However, only individual investors overreact 
to the accrual component of earnings when their attention is high, and this overreaction is not corrected before 
future earnings announcements even if they pay more attention to accounting information.  
4.6 Addressing Measurement Error in the Google Search Volume Index based on Ticker Symbols 
deHaan et al. (2018) argue that Google SVIs based on searches of ticker symbols indicate noise if these 
searches are not immediately followed by searches in investment-related websites, and that there are ticker-
based searches that contain less noise than others. Although I do find that these arguments are important, I am 
less concerned that these arguments affect the validity of my attention to accounting measure or the empirical 
inferences I draw from it. First, I am interested in the attention to particular information represented by the 
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search activity for the information itself regardless of the subsequent search activities. Second, even if noise 
exists in searches in Google that are solely based on ticker symbols, my attention to accounting measure 
would not be affected because it is is based on searches using a ticker symbol or company name combined 
with a word that unambiguously indicates a certain type of information. Nonetheless, I repeat my analyses in 
a subsample of firms with ticker symbols that deHaan et al. (2018) argue produce less noise. My results hold. 
4.7 Using Other Measures of Sophisticated Investors’ Attention to Accounting Information 
As described in Section 3.5, I construct my measure of sophisticated-investor attention by accumulating the 
search traffic on the SEC EDGAR website for all documents that contain financial statements (i.e., 10-K/Qs 
and 8-Ks with Item 5). However, 10-K/Q filings lack timeliness and thus including them when computing the 
abnormal level attention might dilute the actual variation in sophisticated-investor attention (Ben-Rephael et 
al. 2017). To address this concern, I repeat my analyses using a measure of sophisticated-investor attention 
based solely on the search traffic for 8-K filings with Item 5. The empirical results remain consistent.  
It is also possible that sophisticated investors such as financial institutions do not rely so much on EDGAR to 
satisfy their demand for accounting information and instead may turn to other private sources such as 
Bloomberg. Measuring the attention to these sources could produce different results. Although the searches in 
Bloomberg are likely more correlated with EDGAR searches than with Google searches, I repeat my analyses 
using a Bloomberg-based measure of sophisticated-investor attention. The empirical support for my main 
hypotheses is unscathed.  
4.8 Incorporating Potential Passive Attention to Accounting Information Driven by the Media 
My main empirical tests do not consider the influence of the business media because what determines capital 
market behavior is not the media per se but the attention it induces, which would be captured by my measures 
of attention. More importantly, just because accounting information is highlighted by the media does not 
mean that investors pay attention to it (Blankespoor et al. 2018). Therefore, my search-based measures of 
attention to accounting information provide a less ambiguous representation of the attention actively paid by 
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investors. Moreover, traditional measures of media attention, based on news articles on the Internet, do not 
cover all media outlets that investors are exposed to, including television and social networks. To investigate 
the sensitivity of my results to media-driven attention, however, I repeat my analyses using an attention to 
accounting measure that averages the active attention evident from Google searches and the passive attention 
that may be potentially induced by the business press. As expected, the results become weaker in magnitude, 
but the empirical inferences continue to support my hypotheses. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I investigate whether capital market anomalies are attenuated or exacerbated when there is more 
attention to public accounting information from individual investors. Using the Google Trends’ daily search 
volume index (SVI) from 2004 to 2016, I create firm-specific proxies of individual investors’ attention to 
accounting information, such as financial reports and earnings, compared to non-accounting information, such 
as price trends. I find that the price reactions to earnings announcements are stronger, the PEAD is weaker, 
and abnormal returns to portfolios sorted on accruals (profitability) are higher (lower) when individual-
investor attention to accounting information is high. These findings hold even after controlling for 
sophisticated investors’ attention to accounting information and other alternative explanations, including 
institutional ownership, market capitalization, and investor sentiment. In conclusion, under the premise that 
anomalies indicate market inefficiencies, this study suggests that individual investors’ acquisition of 
accounting information might not improve price efficiency if the costs involved are too high. 
Future research could delve into whether certain investors blindly act upon mentions of accounting 
information in the media without acquiring corroborating information, or whether the surge in investor 
attention is stronger when it is triggered by certain outlets. As long as the types and sources of information 
keep evolving and human attentional capacity remains limited, the potential for innovative economics and 
accounting research in this area seems unlimited. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Panel A. Attention and Search-Volume Variables  
Name Definition 
   HIGH ATTENTION TO ACCOUNTING INFORMATION. Indicator variable equal to one if 
attention to accounting information is higher than the median and zero otherwise.  
   LOW ATTENTION TO ACCOUNTING INFORMATION. Indicator variable equal to one if 
attention to accounting information is lower than the median and zero otherwise.  
   INDIVUDIAL-INVESTOR ATTENTION TO ACCOUNTING INFORMATION. The average of 
individual-investor attention to accounting information using ticker symbols (     ) and individual-
investor attention to accounting information using company names (     ).      (     ) is the 
daily or monthly proportion of firm-specific search volume for accounting information over the total 
firm-specific search volume for accounting or other information on Google using ticker symbols 
(company names) as firm identifiers. Firm-specific search volume for accounting information 
(      ) is measured as the total of search volume indices from Google Trends using search terms 
combining the firm identifier and a word that indicates accounting information (i.e., ―report,‖ 
―revenue,‖ ―profit,‖ ―margin,‖ ―cash,‖ ―sale,‖ ―sales,‖ ―earning,‖ ―earnings,‖ ―eps,‖ ―forecast,‖ 
―estimates,‖ ―whisper,‖ ―target,‖ ―dividend,‖ and ―dividends‖). Firm-specific search volume for other 
information (        ) is measured as the total of search volume indices from Google Trends using 
search terms combining the firm’s I/B/E/S ticker symbol or company name and a word that indicates 
non-accounting value-relevant information (i.e., ―stock,‖ ―share,‖ ―bond,‖ ―price,‖ ―quote,‖ 
―finance,‖ ―analysis,‖ ―news,‖ ―wall,‖ ―street,‖ ―yahoo,‖ ―msn,‖ ―money,‖ ―Bloomberg,‖ ―products,‖ 
and ―company‖). Monthly values are created by averaging daily values. 
   ABNORMAL X. If   is an attention variable (i.e.,    or   ), this is the value of variable   that 
exceeds the average   of the same week day for the previous 10 weeks. If   is a search-volume 
variable (i.e.,     or    ), this is the log of 100 plus the value of variable   that exceeds the average 
  of the same week day for the previous 10 weeks. 
   SOPHISTICATED-INVESTOR ATTENTION TO ACCOUNTING INFORMATION. The daily or 
monthly proportion of firm-specific search volume for accounting information over total firm-
specific search volume for accounting or other information on the SEC EDGAR website. Firm-
specific search volume for accounting information (      ) is measured as the total of search count 
for corporate filings that include financial statements (i.e., 10-K/Qs and 8-Ks with item 5) and firm-
specific search volume for other information (        ) is measured as the total of search count for 
all other corporate filings files with the SEC. Monthly values are created by averaging daily values. 
    SEARCH VOLUME FOR CORPORATE FILINGS. The daily or monthly total search count of 
corporate filings on the SEC EDGAR website collected by Ryans (2018). Monthly values are created 
by aggregating daily values. 
    SEARCH VOLUME FOR FIRM-SPECIFIC INFORMATION. The daily or monthly total search 
volume index from Google Trends using firms’ stock ticker symbols as the search term. Monthly 
values are created by aggregating daily values. 
 [   ] CUMULATIVE X. If   is an attention variable (i.e.,    or   ), this is the value of variable   
averaged over the period starting at day   and ending at day  , relative to the event date. If   is a 
search-volume variable (i.e.,     or    ), this is the value of variable   accumulated over the period 
starting at day   and ending at day  , relative to the event date.  
      INDICATOR FOR HIGH/LOW X. An indicator variable equal to one if the monthly variable   is 
higher than the median and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel B. Earnings-Announcement and Anomaly Variables 
Song (July 2019) 
29 
  
Name Definition 
    ACCRUALS. The total value of accounting accruals measured as the sum of changes in current 
assets less cash, short-term investments, current liabilities, and debt in current liabilities scaled by 
lagged book value of equity per split-adjusted shares, as in Fama and French (2008). All inputs are 
from the Quarterly Compustat database.  
   ABNORMAL RETURNS. The daily or monthly Fama-French three-factor adjusted stock returns, 
calculated as raw stock returns subtracted by risk-free returns and five-by-five size and book-to-
market ratio matched portfolio returns. Daily or monthly raw stock returns are from the daily or 
monthly CRSP database, respectively. Risk-free returns and matched portfolio returns are from the 
Fama-French data library (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
data_library.html).  
   ABNORMAL SPREAD. The daily bid-ask spread that exceeds the average bid-ask spread for a 250-
trading-day period ending on the quarter-end date scaled by the standard deviation of bid-ask spread 
over that same 250-day estimation period. Daily bid-ask spread is from the daily CRSP database.  
    MOMENTUM. Prior stock returns measured as the 11-month returns starting from the beginning of 
12
th
 month prior to the current month up to the beginning of the previous month. Monthly stock 
returns are from the monthly CRSP database. 
    PROFITABILITY. The profitability of the firm measured as the lagged value of income before 
extraordinary items less dividends on preferred stock and adjusted for deferred taxes in the income 
statement scaled by lagged book value of equity, as in Fama and French (2008).  
    STANDARDIZED UNEXPECTED EARNINGS. The seasoned quarterly earnings surprise divided 
by the standard deviation of quarterly earnings for the past eight quarters. Seasoned quarterly 
earnings surprise is calculated as the quarterly net income minus the quarterly net income of the 
previous year in the same quarter. All inputs are from the quarterly Compustat database.  
    UNEXPECTED EARNINGS (BASED ON CONSENSUS ANALYST EARNINGS FORECASTS). 
The quarterly earnings that exceeds the consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings scaled by 
stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter. Quarterly earnings and analyst earnings forecasts are from 
the I/B/E/S database. Fiscal quarter-end stock price is from the daily CRSP database.  
    UNEXPECTED EARNINGS (BASED ON PRIOR FISCAL YEAR’S EARNINGS OF THE SAME 
QUARTER). The quarterly earnings number that exceeds the quarterly earnings of the prior fiscal 
year in the same quarter scaled by stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter. Quarterly earnings are 
from the I/B/E/S database. Fiscal quarter-end stock price is from the daily CRSP database.  
 [   ] CUMULATIVE X. The daily value of variable   accumulated over the period starting at day   and 
ending at day   relative to the event date.  
    ABSOLUTE X. The absolute value of variable  . 
 
Panel C. Control and Determinants Variables 
Name Definition 
    BOOK-TO-MARKET RATIO. The ratio of the book value of common equity divided by market 
capitalization. Book value of common equity is calculated from inputs in the quarterly Compustat 
database. Market capitalization is calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding from the monthly CRSP database. 
       INDICATOR FOR A DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT. A daily indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm announces dividends and zero otherwise. Dividend announcement dates are from the daily 
CRSP database.  
     INDICATOR FOR A QUARTERLY EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT. A daily indicator variable 
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Name Definition 
equal to one if the firm announces quarterly earnings and zero otherwise. Quarterly earnings 
announcement dates are from the I/B/E/S database.  
     EARNINGS VOLATILITY. The standard deviation of seasonal quarterly earnings changes over the 
past four years. Quarterly earnings are from the quarterly Compustat database.  
       ANALYST FOLLOWING. The natural log of one plus the number of analyst providing earnings 
forecasts for the firm from the I/B/E/S database.  
         INDICATOR FOR MANAGER EARNINGS GUIDANCE. A daily indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm’s management provides earnings-per-share guidance and zero otherwise. Management 
guidance dates are from the I/B/E/S database.  
          INDICATOR FOR MANAGER NON-EARNINGS GUIDANCE. A daily indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm’s management provides non-earnings guidance and zero otherwise. Management 
guidance dates are from the I/B/E/S database.  
         INDICATOR FOR AN ANALYST EARNINGS FORECAST. A daily indicator variable equal to 
one if an analyst provides a quarterly earnings forecast for the firm and zero otherwise. Analyst 
earnings forecast dates are from the I/B/E/S database.  
      INDICATOR FOR A MERGER & ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENT. A daily indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm announces a merger and acquisition and zero otherwise. Merger and 
acquisition announcement dates are from the SDC Platinum database.  
      NUMBER OF QUARTERLY EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS. The daily number of firms 
announcing their quarterly earnings on that date. Quarterly earnings announcement dates are from the 
I/B/E/S database.  
    INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP. The percentage of the firms’ common equity owned by 
institutional investors from the Thomson Reuters database.  
   FOURTH QUARTER INDICATOR. A daily indicator variable equal to one if the date falls within 
the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter and zero otherwise. Fiscal quarter information is from the quarterly 
Compustat database.  
       STOCK RETURNS. The daily stock returns from the daily CRSP database.  
     INVESTOR SENTIMENT. A monthly market-wide measure of investor sentiment by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006).  
     FIRM SIZE. The market capitalization of the firm, calculated as stock price multiplied by number of 
shares outstanding. Daily and monthly stock prices and number-of-share values are from the daily 
and monthly CRSP databases.  
        INDICATOR FOR MICRO/SMALL/LARGE MARKET CAPITALIZATION. An indicator variable 
equal to one if market capitalization is above the 50th percentile of NYSE stocks, as in Fama and 
French (2008), and zero otherwise. The market capitalization of the firm is calculated as stock price 
multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Stock prices and number-of-share values are from the 
monthly CRSP database.  
     TURNOVER. The average monthly trading volume scaled by the average number of shares 
outstanding over the one-year period ending on the fiscal quarter-end date. Monthly trading volume 
and number of outstanding shares are from the monthly CRSP database.  
      INDICATOR FOR HIGH/LOW X. An indicator variable equal to one if the monthly variable   is 
higher than the median and zero otherwise. 
     RANK OF X. The ranked value of the daily variable   from one to 10. 
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Figure 1. Examples of Google Outputs for Searches for Accounting vs. Non-Accounting Information 
Panel A. Google Output for the Search Term ‘aapl report’ (August 3, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Google Output for the Search Term ‘aapl stock’ (August 3, 2017) 
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Figure 2. Time-Series of Daily Average Attention and Search-Volume Variables around Event Dates 
The following graphs plot the daily averages of abnormal attention-to-accounting-information (    and    ) and abnormal search-
volume (     and      before log transformation) variables for the final sample from 2004 to 2016 for 30 days before and after 
different event dates – Quarterly earnings announcements (    ), analyst quarterly earnings forecasts (        ), manager 
quarterly earnings guidance (        ), and merger and acquisition announcements (     ).      is the abnormal level of search 
volume index from Google Trends.     is the abnormal proportion of search volume for accounting information over total search 
volume, which proxies for individual investors’ attention to accounting information.      is the abnormal level of search traffic on 
the SEC EDGAR website.     is the abnormal proportion of search traffic for corporate filings containing financial statements over 
total search traffic, which proxies for sophisticated investors’ attention to accounting information. Variable definitions are described in 
more detail in Table 2. 
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SVItic SVItic+com AAtic AAtic+com RPV ED EARN FORECAST GUIDEeps GUIDEneps
SVItic+com 0.6908*
AAtic 0.3135* 0.2108*
AAtic+com 0.2170* 0.3055* 0.7127*
RPV 0.1177* 0.2474* 0.0819* 0.1688*
ED 0.0357* 0.0895* 0 0.0341* 0.1955*
EARN 0.0247* 0.0397* 0.0085* 0.0108* 0.0781* 0.0402*
FORECAST 0.0593* 0.1065* 0.0207* 0.0381* 0.1911* 0.0607* 0.1956*
GUIDEeps 0.0014* 0.0114* -0.0005 0.0057* 0.0166* 0.0112* 0.1662* 0.0645*
GUIDEneps 0.0014* 0.0096* -0.0007* 0.0018* 0.0194* 0.0080* 0.1432* 0.0492* -0.0007*
DIVIDE 0.0214* 0.0271* 0.0098* 0.0104* 0.0387* 0.0214* 0.1036* 0.0356* 0.0179* 0.0197*
MERGE 0.0025* 0.0058* 0.0002 0.0010* 0.0164* -0.0004 0.0050* 0.0054* 0.0028* 0.0025*
RETURN 0.0041* 0.0059* -0.0002 0.0009* 0.0017* -0.0004 0.0051* 0.0045* -0.0001 0.0007
nEARN 0.0721* 0.1189* 0.0086* 0.0109* 0.1539* 0.0782* 0.1832* 0.1339* 0.0322* 0.0360*
Q4 -0.0076* -0.0137* -0.0005 0.0012* -0.0145* 0.0073* -0.0088* -0.0127* -0.0019* -0.0013*
TURN -0.0207* 0.0317* -0.0144* 0.0404* 0.0920* -0.0146* -0.0002 0.0656* 0.0089* 0.0120*
SPREAD 0.0931* 0.1818* 0.0186* 0.0429* 0.2383* 0.1130* 0.0932* 0.2127* 0.0251* 0.0177*
FOLLOW 0.0565* 0.1503* 0.0508* 0.1238* 0.2609* 0.0725* 0.0012* 0.2065* 0.0104* 0.0033*
OWN 0.0706* 0.1582* 0.0271* 0.0831* 0.0826* 0.1011* 0.0040* 0.0785* 0.0111* 0.0042*
SIZE 0.1191* 0.2389* 0.0922* 0.1635* 0.3860* 0.0995* 0.0027* 0.1657* 0.0089* 0.0013*
BTM 0.0280* -0.0374* 0.0138* -0.0239* -0.0679* -0.0560* -0.0015* -0.0199* -0.0046* -0.0025*
DIVIDE MERGE RETURN nEARN Q4 TURN SPREAD FOLLOW OWN SIZE
MERGE 0.0009*
RETURN 0.0035* 0.0095*
nEARN 0.0622* 0.0019* -0.0021*
Q4 -0.0025* -0.0006 0.0038* -0.0231*
TURN -0.0126* 0.0005 -0.0007* -0.0008* 0.0096*
SPREAD 0.0413* 0.0038* 0.0117* 0.2064* -0.0084* 0.0791*
FOLLOW 0.0133* 0.0001 0.0022* -0.0089* 0.0458* 0.2405* 0.2065*
OWN 0.0043* 0.0017* 0.0029* 0.0058* 0.0094* 0.2487* 0.1986* 0.3178*
SIZE 0.0271* 0.0022* -0.0007* -0.0034* 0.0115* 0.1246* 0.2799* 0.6131* 0.4326*
BTM 0.0013* -0.0011* -0.0027* 0.0018* -0.0160* -0.0501* -0.0857* -0.1092* -0.1019* -0.1829*
 
Table 2. Univariate Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations 
Panel A. Daily Sample from 2004 to 2016 
 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. p25 p75
SVItic 8,576,855 54.48 59.00 27.72 35.00 77.00
SVItic+com 8,576,855 89.09 88.00 41.16 60.00 119.0
AAtic 8,576,855 0.091 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.069
AAtic+com 8,576,855 0.077 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.133
RPV 8,576,855 18.63 9.000 26.61 2.000 23.00
ED 8,576,855 0.511 0.583 0.351 0.143 0.800
EARN 8,576,855 0.011 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000
FORECAST 8,576,855 0.071 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.000
GUIDEeps 8,576,855 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000
GUIDEneps 8,576,855 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000
DIVIDE 8,576,855 0.004 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000
MERGE 8,576,855 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
RETURN 8,576,855 0.032 0.000 2.199 -0.551 0.591
nEARN 8,576,855 26.02 6.000 47.91 0.000 25.00
Q4 8,576,855 0.273 0.000 0.446 0.000 1.000
TURN 8,576,855 2.043 1.563 1.726 0.921 2.612
SPREAD 8,576,855 0.566 0.310 0.798 0.000 0.780
FOLLOW 8,576,855 1.183 1.099 0.817 0.693 1.792
OWN 8,576,855 0.630 0.695 0.276 0.454 0.844
SIZE 8,576,855 7.046 7.065 1.843 5.801 8.267
BTM 8,576,855 0.576 0.469 0.532 0.263 0.754
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aSVItic[-1,+1] aSVItic+com[-1,+1] aAAtic[-1,+1] aAAtic+com[-1,+1] aRPV[-1,+1] aED[-1,+1] UEA UEQ AR[-1,+1]
aSVItic+com[-1,+1] 0.7185*
aAAtic[-1,+1] 0.0958* 0.0750*
aAAtic+com[-1,+1] 0.0885* 0.0810* 0.7558*
aRPV[-1,+1] 0.0853* 0.0857* 0.0762* 0.0842*
aED[-1,+1] -0.001 0.0014 0.0028 0.0058 -0.0291*
UEA 0.0022 -0.0007 0.0034 0.0029 -0.0111* -0.0034
UEQ 0.0014 -0.0054 0.0006 -0.0067* -0.0208* 0.0056 0.3708*
AR[-1,+1] 0.003 0.0016 0.003 0.0003 -0.0175* -0.0036 0.1143* 0.0455*
AS[-1,+1] 0.0672* 0.0636* 0.0445* 0.0391* 0.0627* 0.0111* 0.0167* -0.0028 0.0158*
AAtic AAtic+com ED ACC PRO SUE AR OWN SIZE EARN
AAtic+com 0.7128*
ED -0.0169* 0.0300*
ACC 0.0064* -0.0004 -0.0025
PRO 0.0346* 0.0515* 0.0371* 0.0347*
SUE -0.0060* -0.0024 -0.0080* 0.0017 0.2459*
AR -0.0019 0.0004 -0.001 -0.0022 0.0071* 0.0171*
OWN 0.0430* 0.1105* 0.0950* -0.0002 0.1115* 0.0255* 0.0132*
SIZE 0.1622* 0.2486* -0.0551* 0.0067* 0.1880* 0.0559* -0.0113* 0.4538*
EARN 0.0045* 0.0064* 0.0330* 0.0004 -0.0032* -0.0019 0.0113* 0.0016 -0.0016
SENT -0.0306* -0.0452* -0.0551* 0.0239* 0.0479* 0.0860* 0.0098* 0.0396* 0.0695* -0.0002
Table 2. (continued) 
Panel B. Quarterly Earnings Announcement Event Sample from 2004 to 2016 
 
 
Panel C. Monthly Sample from 2004 to 2015 (due to the availability of investor sentiment data) 
 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. p25 p75
aSVItic[-1,+1] 86,810 0.027 0.021 0.136 -0.046 0.101
aSVItic+com[-1,+1] 86,810 0.033 0.030 0.099 -0.030 0.095
aAAtic[-1,+1] 86,810 0.009 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.000
aAAtic+com[-1,+1] 86,810 0.007 0.000 0.045 -0.002 0.005
aRPV[-1,+1] 86,810 0.113 0.066 0.204 0.000 0.174
aED[-1,+1] 86,810 0.032 0.016 0.081 0.000 0.082
UEA 86,810 -0.171 0.040 3.682 -0.087 0.223
UEQ 86,810 0.281 0.107 8.180 -0.291 0.453
AR[-1,+1] 86,810 0.258 0.101 6.411 -3.545 4.040
AS[-1,+1] 86,810 10.48 4.532 35.38 0.081 12.71
FOLLOW 86,810 1.192 1.099 0.852 0.693 1.792
OWN 86,810 0.625 0.702 0.290 0.466 0.844
EVOL 86,810 50.04 9.084 131.4 3.125 31.17
TURN 86,810 2.103 1.628 1.678 1.010 2.663
GUIDE 86,810 0.290 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000
SIZE 86,810 7.332 7.312 1.736 6.155 8.458
BTM 86,810 0.547 0.454 0.491 0.260 0.721
nEARN 86,810 116.4 103.0 77.99 49.00 180.0
Q4 86,810 0.239 0.000 0.427 0.000 0.000
Variable N Mean Median S.D. p25 p75
AAtic 387,048 0.072 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.092
AAtic+com 387,048 0.062 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.111
ED 387,048 0.560 0.629 0.243 0.503 0.717
ACC 387,048 1.047 0.452 61.24 -4.498 5.967
PRO 387,048 0.742 2.259 15.62 0.023 4.333
SUE 387,048 4.031 6.130 73.04 -21.02 38.71
AR 387,048 0.126 -0.237 10.89 -5.545 5.210
OWN 387,048 0.623 0.678 0.282 0.423 0.838
SIZE 387,048 6.881 6.835 1.875 5.581 8.090
EARN 387,048 0.332 0.000 0.471 0.000 1.000
SENT 387,048 -0.017 0.037 0.354 -0.169 0.194
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SVItic AAtic SVItic+com AAtic+com RPV ED
EARN 2.682*** 0.014*** 5.123*** 0.012*** 10.84*** 0.083***
(0.194) (0.001) (0.277) (0.001) (0.284) (0.002)
EARN (lagged) 2.095*** 0.003 3.230*** 0.003* 4.941*** 0.083***
(0.242) (0.002) (0.371) (0.001) (0.339) (0.003)
FORECAST 1.444*** 0.003 2.995*** 0.001 6.152*** 0.007***
(0.185) (0.001) (0.287) (0.001) (0.287) (0.002)
FORECAST (lagged) 0.788*** 0.001 1.498*** 0.000 3.164*** 0.011***
(0.155) (0.001) (0.247) (0.001) (0.207) (0.002)
GUIDEeps -2.912** -0.011 3.251* 0.015* -0.209 0.047***
(0.958) (0.007) (1.382) (0.007) (1.185) (0.011)
GUIDEeps (lagged) -2.353* -0.028** 4.444** 0.008 -1.545 0.042***
(0.952) (0.007) (1.422) (0.007) (1.085) (0.011)
GUIDEneps -3.321*** -0.011 2.159 -0.001 3.207** 0.001
(0.839) (0.007) (1.348) (0.006) (1.191) (0.013)
GUIDEneps (lagged) -2.329* -0.025*** 3.309* -0.011* 2.078 0.005
(0.910) (0.006) (1.389) (0.005) (1.157) (0.013)
DIVIDE 2.559*** 0.013*** 2.210*** 0.008*** 1.826*** 0.022***
(0.314) (0.003) (0.444) (0.002) (0.354) (0.004)
DIVIDE (lagged) 2.353*** 0.013*** 1.824*** 0.008*** 1.945*** 0.020***
(0.325) (0.003) (0.454) (0.002) (0.331) (0.004)
MERGE 6.889*** 0.003 25.92*** 0.014 58.16*** -0.062***
(1.456) (0.010) (2.381) (0.008) (2.832) (0.012)
MERGE (lagged) 4.748*** 0.005 17.70*** 0.012 53.82*** -0.097***
(1.440) (0.009) (2.221) (0.007) (2.764) (0.012)
RETURN 0.038*** 0.000 0.072*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
RETURN (lagged) 0.038*** 0.000 0.070*** 0.000 -0.022*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
TURN -0.613*** -0.003* -0.407 0.001 0.564*** -0.012***
(0.165) (0.001) (0.220) (0.001) (0.132) (0.002)
SPREAD 0.345 0.000 1.212** -0.001 1.539*** 0.011***
(0.295) (0.002) (0.421) (0.002) (0.366) (0.003)
FOLLOW -0.686 0.002 0.704 0.009*** 3.656*** 0.019***
(0.392) (0.003) (0.558) (0.002) (0.399) (0.004)
OWN 1.971 -0.006 8.705*** 0.007 -8.736*** 0.100***
(1.280) (0.009) (1.633) (0.006) (1.016) (0.013)
SIZEQ10 1.443*** 0.007*** 3.022*** 0.006*** 2.707*** 0.002
(0.152) (0.001) (0.211) (0.001) (0.132) (0.002)
BTMQ10 0.995*** 0.004*** 0.717*** 0.001* -0.194* -0.016***
(0.109) (0.001) (0.157) (0.001) (0.085) (0.001)
nEARN 1.130*** 0.000 2.842*** 0.000 1.795*** 0.010***
(0.044) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000)
Q4 0.209 0.000 0.083 0.000 -1.151*** -0.001
(0.215) (0.001) (0.323) (0.001) (0.096) (0.003)
Constant 35.52*** 0.036** 47.08*** 0.021*** -5.930*** 0.467***
(1.203) (0.008) (1.595) (0.006) (0.763) (0.011)
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.059 0.015 0.139 0.032 0.339 0.169
N 8,576,855 8,576,855 8,576,855 8,576,855 8,576,855 8,576,855
Table 3. Determinants of Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays regressions of daily attention-to-accounting-information (   and   ) and search-volume (    and    ) variables 
on various determinants for the final sample from 2004 to 2016. Determinants are contemporaneous and lagged indicators for 
quarterly earnings announcements (    ), analyst quarterly earnings forecasts (        ), manager quarterly earnings guidance 
(        ), manager quarterly non-earnings guidance (         ), and merger and acquisition announcements (     ), daily 
stock returns (      ), stock turnover (    ), analyst following (      ), institutional ownership (   ), investor sentiment 
(    ), rank of firm size (       ), rank of book-to-market ratio (      ), number of quarterly earnings announcements (     ), 
and a fourth quarter indicator (  ). Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses below the 
coefficients.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Announcement Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays regressions of cumulative abnormal stock returns for the three-day period before and after quarterly earnings 
announcements (  [     ]) on abnormal levels of attention-to-accounting-information (   [     ])  and    [     ]) ) and 
search-volume (    [     ])  and     [     ]) ) variables interacted with unexpected earnings (  ) based on consensus analyst 
quarterly earnings forecasts (   ) or prior year’s earnings of the same quarter (   ) for the final sample from 2004 to 2016. Control 
variables are earnings volatility (    ), stock turnover (    ), analyst following (      ), institutional ownership (   ), 
management guidance (     ), rank of firm size (       ), rank of book-to-market ratio (      ), rank of the number of quarterly 
earnings announcements on the same day (     ), and a fourth quarter indicator (  ). Variable definitions are described in more 
detail in Table 2. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors double-
clustered by quarter and industry are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients with a predicted sign are tested using one-tail tests. 
Panel A. Regressions of Announcement Abnormal Returns on aAA and/or aSVI interacted with UE 
  
 
AA = AAtic  and SVI = SVItic UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ
UE + 0.197*** 0.364*** 0.198*** 0.037*** 0.196*** 0.036*** 0.196*** 0.036***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007)
aSVI[-1,+1] 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aSVI[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aAA[-1,+1] 0.543 0.489 0.516 0.467 0.313 0.267
(0.339) (0.362) (0.338) (0.359) (0.336) (0.356)
aAA[-1,+1] x UE + 0.137*** 0.032 0.132** 0.029 0.121* 0.055*
(0.059) (0.039) (0.062) (0.040) (0.082) (0.040)
aSVI[-1,+1] x aAA[-1,+1] 0.010* 0.010
(0.005) (0.005)
aSVI[-1,+1] x aAA[-1,+1] x UE + 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002)
Constant 0.112 -0.162 0.120 -0.155 0.113 -0.160 0.114 -0.159
(0.163) (0.157) (0.162) (0.155) (0.163) (0.156) (0.162) (0.156)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003
N 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810
AA = AAtic+com and SVI = SVItic+com UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ
UE + 0.197*** 0.354*** 0.198*** 0.037*** 0.196*** 0.035*** 0.196*** 0.035***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.023) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007)
aSVI[-1,+1] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aSVI[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aAA[-1,+1] 0.473 0.402 0.444 0.382 -0.055 -0.163
(0.306) (0.306) (0.299) (0.300) (0.414) (0.446)
aAA[-1,+1] x UE + 0.191* 0.165* 0.182* 0.155* 0.310*** 0.242**
0.124 (0.114) (0.122) (0.118) (0.133) (0.121)
aSVI[-1,+1] x aAA[-1,+1] 0.015 0.017
(0.008) (0.009)
aSVI[-1,+1] x aAA[-1,+1] x UE + -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Constant 0.115 -0.157 0.121 -0.154 0.116 -0.155 0.118 -0.152
(0.164) (0.157) (0.162) (0.154) (0.164) (0.155) (0.164) (0.155)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003
N 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810
Predicted 
Sign
Predicted 
Sign
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Table 4. (continued) 
 
 
Panel B. Regressions of Announcement Abnormal Returns on aAA and/or aSVI interacted with UE, 
controlling for aED and/or aRPV interacted with UE 
 
 
 
ED and RPV UE = UE
A
UE = UE
Q
UE = UE
A
UE = UE
Q
UE = UE
A
UE = UE
Q
UE = UE
A
UE = UE
Q
UE + 0.193*** 0.035*** 0.195*** 0.036*** 0.189*** 0.034*** 0.189*** 0.035***
(0.023) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.008)
aRPV[-1,+1] -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aRPV[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aED[-1,+1] -0.290 -0.377 -0.311 -0.401* -0.195 -0.252
(0.211) (0.200) (0.207) (0.195) (0.245) (0.240)
aED[-1,+1] x UE + 0.108* 0.035 0.113* 0.038* 0.105 0.026
(0.079) (0.030) (0.078) (0.030) (0.085) (0.032)
aRPV[-1,+1] x aED[-1,+1] -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002)
aRPV[-1,+1] x aED[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.137 -0.132 0.129 -0.144 0.147 -0.119 0.145 -0.121
(0.162) (0.155) (0.160) (0.153) (0.160) (0.153) (0.160) (0.154)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.004
N 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810
Predicted 
Sign
UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ UE = UEA UE = UEQ
UE + 0.191*** 0.035*** 0.194*** 0.036*** 0.191*** 0.034*** 0.194*** 0.035***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.024) (0.007)
aSVI[-1,+1] 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aSVI[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aRPV[-1,+1] -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aRPV[-1,+1] x UE + 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
aAA[-1,+1] 0.546 0.491 0.478 0.409
(0.339) (0.363) (0.308) (0.308)
aAA[-1,+1] x UE + 0.143*** 0.033 0.199* 0.166*
(0.059) (0.039) (0.126) (0.113)
aED[-1,+1] -0.293 -0.380 -0.294 -0.383
(0.212) (0.201) (0.213) (0.202)
aED[-1,+1] x UE + 0.110 0.036 0.110 0.035
(0.079) (0.030) (0.080) (0.030)
Constant 0.128 -0.140 0.129 -0.143 0.131 -0.135 0.130 -0.141
(0.163) (0.156) (0.159) (0.152) (0.164) (0.157) (0.160) (0.152)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003
N 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810 86,810
Predicted 
Sign
AA = AAtic  and SVI = SVItic AA = AAtic+com and SVI = SVItic+com 
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Table 5. Abnormal Returns to Hedge Portfolios by Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays the means of monthly abnormal returns to long-short hedge portfolios sorted on anomaly variables by high/low 
levels of attention to accounting information by firms’ individual (  ) and sophisticated (  ) investors in the month of portfolio 
formation for the final sample from 2004 to 2015. Hedge portfolio sorts are based on extreme quintiles of the anomaly variables at the 
beginning of each month. High/low attention to accounting information is determined by whether the value is above/below the cross-
sectional median. Abnormal returns are size- and book-to-market-adjusted stock returns using returns of five-by-five size- and book-
to-market-matched stock portfolios, which are comparable to the alphas in Fama-French three-factor regressions (Fama and French, 
2008). Anomaly variables are accounting accruals (   ), profitability (   ), and standardized seasonal unexpected quarterly 
earnings (   ). Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Standard deviations and standard errors are in 
parentheses below respective mean values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Means and Standard Deviations of ACC, PRO, and SUE by High/Low AA and ED 
 
 
Panel B. Mean Abnormal Returns to ACC, PRO, and SUE Hedge Portfolios by High/Low AA and ED 
 
Mean 1.408 *** 0.876 *** 1.030 *** 1.059 *** 1.290 *** 0.802 ***
S.D. (55.84) (63.64) (54.73) (65.67) (68.41) (53.13)
Mean 1.955 *** 0.168 *** 2.012 *** -0.203 *** -0.299 *** 1.781 ***
S.D. (14.20) (16.21) (14.17) (16.55) (16.82) (14.25)
Mean 4.391 *** 3.860 *** 4.727 *** 3.512 *** 4.646 *** 3.395 ***
S.D. (72.09) (73.49) (70.89) (74.60) (73.86) (72.20)
Low
ACC
PRO
SUE
AA
tic 
AA
tic+com ED
High Low High Low High
Mean
S.E.
Mean *** * ***
S.E.
Mean *** *** ***
S.E.
Mean 0.203 *** -0.080 * -0.081 -0.019 0.285 *** -0.061 * 0.345 ***
S.E. (0.070) (0.053) (0.071) (0.053) (0.100) (0.075) (0.130)
Mean 0.233 *** 0.412 *** 0.000 -0.112 ** 0.233 ** 0.524 *** -0.291 **
S.E. (0.056) (0.051) (0.097) (0.061) (0.105) (0.082) (0.140)
Mean 0.323 *** 0.368 *** -0.058 -0.201 *** 0.381 *** 0.569 *** -0.188
S.E. (0.063) (0.049) (0.072) (0.052) (0.095) (0.072) (0.124)
Mean 0.194 *** -0.125 ** -0.047 -0.033 0.241 *** -0.092 0.333 ***
S.E. (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.087) (0.083) (0.123)
Mean 0.275 *** 0.416 *** 0.047 -0.148 ** 0.229 ** 0.564 *** -0.335 **
S.E. (0.048) (0.059) (0.086) (0.065) (0.091) (0.092) (0.133)
Mean 0.314 *** 0.381 *** -0.011 -0.253 *** 0.325 *** 0.634 *** -0.309 ***
S.E. (0.056) (0.054) (0.063) (0.056) (0.084) (0.078) (0.117)
Mean 0.103 ** -0.073 0.027 -0.101 ** 0.076 0.028 0.048
S.E. (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.086) (0.085) (0.121)
Mean 0.278 *** 0.425 *** 0.061 -0.187 *** 0.216 ** 0.612 *** -0.396 ***
S.E. (0.048) (0.060) (0.078) (0.069) (0.088) (0.095) (0.130)
Mean 0.366 *** 0.343 *** 0.011 -0.320 *** 0.355 *** 0.663 *** -0.308 ***
S.E. (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.080) (0.083) (0.115)
0.426
(0.064)
0.500
(0.057)
SUE
PRO
Long Short
ACC -0.019
(0.053)
-0.080
(0.053)
(0.039) (0.042)
0.344 -0.082
(0.038) (0.052)
0.349 -0.152
Long-Short
0.055
(0.061)
ACC
PRO
SUE
AAtic+com
LowHigh High High
Low
ACC
PRO
SUE
LowHigh High High
ACC
PRO
SUE
ED
Long Short Long-Short
AAtic
Long Short Long-Short
Low
Low
Low
Low High-Low
Long Short Long-Short
High
Low
High High High-LowLow
High-Low
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Table 6. Abnormal Returns to Hedge Portfolios by Attention to Accounting Information and 
Institutional Ownership, Market Capitalization, and Investor Sentiment 
This table displays the means of monthly abnormal returns to long-short hedge portfolios sorted on anomaly variables by high/low 
levels of attention to accounting information by firms’ individual (  ) and sophisticated (  ) investors in the month of portfolio 
formation and micro/small/large market capitalization (    ), high/low levels of institutional ownership (    , or high/low investor 
sentiment (      for the final sample from 2004 to 2015.. Hedge portfolio sorts are based on extreme quintiles of the anomaly 
variables at the beginning of each month. High/low attention to accounting information is determined by whether the value is 
above/below the cross-sectional median. Size breakpoints are determined using the 20th and 50th percentiles of market cap for NYSE 
stocks, as in Fama and French (2008). Abnormal returns are size- and book-to-market-adjusted stock returns using returns of five-by-
five size- and book-to-market-matched stock portfolios. Anomaly variables are accounting accruals (   ), profitability (   ), and 
standardized seasonal unexpected quarterly earnings (   ). Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Standard 
errors are in parentheses below respective mean values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2.  
Panel A. Mean Abnormal Returns to ACC, PRO, and SUE Hedge Portfolios by High/Low AA and ED 
and High/Low Institutional Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.041 0.094
0.083 0.718 ***
0.014 0.886 ***
0.026 -0.084 0.110 0.372 *** -0.022 0.394 **
(0.117) (0.095) (0.155) (0.140) (0.098) (0.180)
-0.182 0.215 ** -0.397 *** 0.637 *** 0.800 *** -0.163
(0.119) (0.097) (0.159) (0.154) (0.123) (0.208)
0.029 0.076 -0.047 0.700 *** 0.973 *** -0.274
(0.120) (0.090) (0.153) (0.148) (0.109) (0.195)
0.031 -0.131 0.162 0.336 *** -0.059 0.395 **
(0.102) (0.123) (0.148) (0.125) (0.129) (0.169)
-0.108 0.234 * -0.343 *** 0.677 *** 0.727 *** -0.049
(0.104) (0.125) (0.153) (0.139) (0.156) (0.199)
-0.062 0.137 -0.198 0.795 *** 0.943 *** -0.147
(0.105) (0.112) (0.145) (0.135) (0.141) (0.185)
-0.025 -0.074 0.049 0.102 0.088 0.013
(0.100) (0.110) (0.149) (0.121) (0.108) (0.164)
-0.146 0.357 *** -0.503 *** 0.651 *** 0.761 *** -0.110
(0.100) (0.116) (0.153) (0.134) (0.138) (0.196)
-0.061 0.133 -0.194 0.808 *** 0.960 *** -0.152
(0.096) (0.107) (0.145) (0.131) (0.119) (0.180)
SUE
(0.071) (0.088)
PRO
(0.075) (0.096)
ACC
Institutional Ownership (OWN)
High Low
(0.073) (0.080)
Long-Short Long-Short
ACC
AAtic 
High High-Low High High-Low
ACC
PRO
SUE
AAtic+com 
High High-Low High High-Low
Low Low
Low Low
PRO
SUE
ACC
PRO
SUE
ED
High High-Low High High-LowLowLow
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Table 6. (continued) 
Panel B. Mean Abnormal Returns to ACC, PRO, and SUE Hedge Portfolios by High/Low AA and ED 
and Micro/Small/Large Market Capitalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.040 0.080
(0.081) (0.076)
0.180 * 0.638 ***
(0.093) (0.089)
0.108 0.725 ***
(0.075) (0.076)
0.039 -0.115 0.154 0.448 *** -0.047 0.495 ***
(0.116) (0.114) (0.164) (0.146) (0.089) (0.177)
-0.030 0.376 *** -0.406 * 0.484 *** 0.692 *** -0.208
(0.131) (0.133) (0.190) (0.171) (0.104) (0.207)
0.043 0.185 * -0.143 0.600 *** 0.766 *** -0.165
(0.104) (0.110) (0.153) (0.149) (0.089) (0.179)
0.279 ** -0.145 0.424 ** 0.407 *** -0.092 0.498 ***
(0.129) (0.126) (0.209) (0.127) (0.095) (0.163)
-0.125 0.271 ** -0.396 ** 0.441 *** 0.734 *** -0.293
(0.133) (0.138) (0.222) (0.147) (0.112) (0.190)
0.092 0.497 *** -0.405 * 0.505 *** 0.830 *** -0.324 *
(0.123) (0.117) (0.197) (0.131) (0.094) (0.165)
-0.002 -0.079 0.077 0.107 0.060 0.047
(0.114) (0.116) (0.164) (0.112) (0.105) (0.155)
0.038 0.352 ** -0.314 0.451 *** 0.774 *** -0.323 *
(0.127) (0.141) (0.191) (0.127) (0.125) (0.181)
0.034 0.205 * -0.171 0.576 *** 0.861 *** -0.285 **
(0.103) (0.110) (0.153) (0.109) (0.107) (0.155)
Market Capitalization (SIZE)
Large Small and Micro
Long-Short Long-Short
ACC
PRO
SUE
AAtic 
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
ACC
PRO
SUE
AAtic+com 
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
ACC
PRO
PRO
SUE
SUE
ED
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
ACC
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Table 6. (continued) 
Panel C. Mean Abnormal Returns to ACC, PRO, and SUE Hedge Portfolios by High/Low AA and ED 
and High/Low Investor Sentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.058 0.038
(0.080) (0.091)
0.718 *** 0.139
(0.086) (0.095)
0.693 *** 0.330 ***
(0.077) (0.085)
0.232 * -0.018 0.250 0.333 ** -0.104 0.437 **
(0.134) (0.099) (0.194) (0.147) (0.114) (0.221)
0.558 *** 0.812 *** -0.254 -0.063 0.225 * -0.287 **
(0.144) (0.108) (0.212) (0.152) (0.123) (0.234)
0.645 *** 0.710 *** -0.065 0.129 0.427 *** -0.298 *
(0.130) (0.095) (0.188) (0.139) (0.107) (0.207)
0.200 * -0.041 0.241 -0.013 -0.090 0.078
(0.115) (0.109) (0.181) (0.100) (0.137) (0.171)
0.608 *** 0.844 *** -0.236 0.053 0.359 ** -0.306
(0.124) (0.121) (0.198) (0.116) (0.158) (0.196)
0.570 *** 0.771 *** -0.201 0.007 0.180 * -0.174
(0.114) (0.104) (0.176) (0.120) (0.097) (0.156)
0.081 0.044 0.037 0.071 0.011 0.060
(0.116) (0.110) (0.179) (0.127) (0.129) (0.207)
0.627 *** 0.810 *** -0.182 * -0.155 0.394 *** -0.549 ***
(0.120) (0.125) (0.193) (0.128) (0.145) (0.219)
0.633 *** 0.754 *** -0.121 ** 0.106 0.564 *** -0.458 ***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.172) (0.116) (0.125) (0.194)
LowHigh
Long-ShortLong-Short
Investor Sentiment (SENT)
PRO
SUE
AAtic+com 
AAtic 
High High-LowHigh High-Low LowLow
LowLow
ACC
PRO
SUE
SUE
PRO
ACC
ACC
PRO
SUE
ED
High High-LowHigh High-Low
High-LowHigh High-Low High
ACC
Low Low
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ACC Attention
0.083 -0.469 ** 0.080 -0.459 ** -0.019 -0.575 ***
(0.071) (0.200) (0.062) (0.198) (0.062) (0.196)
-0.248 *** -0.795 *** -0.307 *** -0.832 *** -0.253 *** -0.758 ***
(0.054) (0.196) (0.060) (0.197) (0.061) (0.193)
-0.183 ** -0.850 *** -0.153 ** -0.833 *** -0.098 -0.793 ***
(0.072) (0.199) (0.063) (0.197) (0.062) (0.196)
-0.188 *** -0.814 *** -0.210 *** -0.823 *** -0.268 *** -0.890 ***
(0.054) (0.194) (0.060) (0.195) (0.061) (0.192)
0.126 ** 0.243 0.104 ** 0.235 0.013 0.142
(0.057) (0.156) (0.049) (0.155) (0.049) (0.153)
-0.026 0.069 -0.037 0.060 0.031 0.146
(0.042) (0.152) (0.046) (0.153) (0.047) (0.151)
0.152 ** 0.174 ** 0.142 ** 0.175 ** -0.018 -0.005
[4.71] [5.89] [4.50] [6.29] [0.07] [0.01]
PRO Attention
0.124 ** -0.400 ** 0.175 *** -0.391 ** 0.171 *** -0.379 **
(0.057) (0.177) (0.049) (0.180) (0.049) (0.175)
0.282 *** -0.351 ** 0.272 *** -0.362 ** 0.285 *** -0.327 *
(0.051) (0.179) (0.060) (0.177) (0.061) (0.179)
-0.243 ** -0.939 *** -0.213 ** -0.925 *** -0.223 *** -0.940 ***
(0.099) (0.249) (0.087) (0.246) (0.080) (0.246)
-0.457 *** -1.131 *** -0.497 *** -1.150 *** -0.530 *** -1.141 ***
(0.062) (0.244) (0.066) (0.244) (0.070) (0.240)
0.305 *** 0.226 0.354 *** 0.190 0.313 *** 0.203
(0.058) (0.162) (0.051) (0.163) (0.050) (0.161)
0.315 *** 0.119 0.281 *** 0.166 0.313 *** 0.179
(0.045) (0.163) (0.050) (0.162) (0.052) (0.160)
-0.010 0.106 0.074 0.025 0.000 0.024
[0.02] [1.96] [1.10] [0.11] [0.00] [0.11]
SUE Attention
0.229 *** -0.046 0.229 *** -0.040 0.285 *** -0.019
(0.064) (0.185) (0.057) (0.184) (0.055) (0.183)
0.274 *** -0.144 0.282 *** -0.160 0.238 *** -0.131
(0.050) (0.185) (0.055) (0.186) (0.057) (0.181)
-0.179 ** -1.139 *** -0.132 ** -1.101 *** -0.119 ** -1.057 ***
(0.073) (0.199) (0.065) (0.197) (0.060) (0.195)
-0.375 *** -1.304 *** -0.435 *** -1.345 *** -0.502 *** -1.344 ***
(0.053) (0.196) (0.057) (0.196) (0.062) (0.193)
0.181 *** 0.637 *** 0.154 *** 0.616 *** 0.158 *** 0.584 ***
(0.055) (0.150) (0.048) (0.150) (0.046) (0.148)
0.335 *** 0.727 *** 0.377 *** 0.753 *** 0.408 *** 0.762 ***
(0.040) (0.149) (0.044) (0.150) (0.046) (0.147)
-0.154 ** -0.091 -0.223 *** -0.138 ** -0.250 *** -0.178 ***
[5.25] [1.74] [12.04] [4.27] [15.21] [7.61]
Attention = AAtic Attention = AAtic+com Attention = ED
Fama-French 3 Factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables No Yes No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
No
(2)
AL
AL
Long-Short AH
Long-Short AH-AL
Short
Long-Short
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1)
(2)
Long AH
Long-Short AL
Short
AHShort
AL
Long AL
(2)
Long-Short
(1)(1) (2) (1)
Short
Long AH
AH
Long AL
Long-Short AL
Long-Short AH-AL
Long-Short AH
Short AL
AHShort
AHLong
ALLong
AH-AL
Long-Short AH
Table 7. Alphas for Hedge Portfolios in Regressions including Indicator Variables for High and Low 
Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays the alphas in monthly Frama-French three-factor regressions, including indicator variables for and high/low levels 
of attention to accounting information (   and   ) for stock portfolios sorted on extreme-quintile anomaly variables in the month of 
portfolio formation for the final sample from 2004 to 2015. The regression model is: 
                                                
           
    
  
       
    
 
    
where     is the stock returns for firm   in month ,     is the risk-free rate,    is an indicator equal to one if attention to accounting 
information is low and zero otherwise,    is an indicator equal to one if attention to accounting information is high and zero otherwise, 
        is an indicator equal to one if market capitalization is above 50th percentile of NYSE stocks as in Fama and French (2008) 
and zero otherwise,         is an indicator equal to one if institutional ownership is high and zero otherwise,          is an 
indicator equal to one if investor sentiment is high and zero otherwise, and    ,     , and     are market, size, and book-to-
market premiums, respectively. High/low attention to accounting information is determined by whether the value is above/below the 
cross-sectional median. Anomaly variables are accounting accruals (   ), profitability (   ), and standardized seasonal unexpected 
quarterly earnings (   ). Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. F-statistics for the 
difference between    and    are presented in hard brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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0.077 0.081 0.019 -0.072
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060)
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
-0.099 0.020 -0.100 -0.125
(0.058) (0.064) (0.064) (0.053)
0.237 *** 0.215 *** 0.151 ** -0.020
(0.056) (0.065) (0.073) (0.074)
-0.324 *** -0.375 *** -0.261 ** -0.114
(0.081) (0.085) (0.101) (0.090)
0.072 0.077 0.007 -0.031
(0.052) (0.070) (0.064) (0.072)
0.120 0.087 -0.082 -0.082
(0.069) (0.061) (0.076) (0.067)
-0.047 -0.009 0.089 0.051
(0.087) (0.093) (0.100) (0.098)
t+4
Attention                             
= AAtic+com
High
Low
t+1 t+2
from the month of t                                  
to the month before t+k
Attention                                     
= ED
High
Low
t+3
High-Low
High-Low
Table 8. The Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays the means of the three-day abnormal returns (  [    ]) around future quarterly earnings announcements for long-
short hedge portfolios sorted on standardized unexpected quarterly earnings (   ) in quarter   by high/low levels of attention to 
accounting information for the final sample from 2004 to 2016. Panel A displays the future-announcement abnormal returns for hedge 
portfolios by high/low abnormal attention to accounting information around the quarterly earnings announcement (   [    ] 
and    [    ]) in quarter  . Panel B displays the future-announcement abnormal returns for hedge portfolios of stock with low 
abnormal attention to accounting information around the quarterly earnings announcement in quarter   by high/low attention to 
accounting information (   and   ) from the month of the quarterly earnings announcement in quarter   up to the month before the 
future quarterly earnings announcement of interest (    . Hedge portfolio sorts are based on extreme quintiles of     at the time of 
the quarterly earnings announcement for quarter  . High/low attention to accounting information is determined by whether the value is 
above/below the cross-sectional median. Abnormal returns are size- and book-to-market-adjusted stock returns using returns of five-
by-five size- and book-to-market-matched stock portfolios. Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors are in parentheses below respective mean values. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Abnormal Returns around the Earnings Announcement in Quarter t+k for SUE Portfolios by 
High/Low Abnormal Attention around the Earnings Announcement in Quarter t 
 
Panel B. Abnormal Returns around the Earnings Announcement in Quarter t+k for SUE Portfolios of Stock 
with Low Abnormal Attention around Quarter t by High/Low Attention before Quarter t+k 
-0.192 0.016 -0.044 -0.049
(0.077) (0.084) (0.071) (0.055)
0.161 *** 0.159 *** 0.124 ** -0.130
(0.046) (0.053) (0.059) (0.079)
-0.353 *** -0.143 * -0.168 * 0.081
(0.090) (0.099) (0.092) (0.096)
0.002 0.105 * 0.009 -0.123
(0.064) (0.062) (0.079) (0.069)
0.159 *** 0.134 ** 0.068 -0.223
(0.062) (0.056) (0.061) (0.067)
-0.156 ** -0.029 -0.059 -0.100
(0.089) (0.083) (0.100) (0.096)
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Abnormal Attention     
= aAA
tic+com
High
Low
High-Low
t
Abnormal Attention       
= aED
High
Low
High-Low
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Table 9.  The Accrual Anomaly, the Profit Anomaly, and Attention to Accounting Information 
This table displays the means of the three-day abnormal returns around (  [     ]) or monthly abnormal returns after (  ) 
quarterly earnings announcements to long-short hedge portfolios sorted on accruals (   ) or profitability (   ) in quarter   by 
high/low levels of attention to accounting information for the final sample from 2004 to 2016. Panel A displays the monthly abnormal 
returns during the three-month period after quarterly earnings announcement (  ) by high/low abnormal attention to accounting 
information during the announcement (   [     ] and    [     ]) for hedge portfolios sorted on accruals (   ) or profitability 
(   ) at the time of announcement. Panel B displays the monthly abnormal returns during the two months starting one month after 
quarterly earnings announcement (  ) by high/low attention to accounting information during the previous month (   and   ) for 
    (     hedge portfolios of stock with high (low) levels of abnormal attention to accounting information during the 
announcement (   [     ] and    [     ]). Hedge portfolio sorts are based on extreme quintiles of     or    . High/low 
attention to accounting information is determined by whether the value is above/below the cross-sectional median. Abnormal returns 
are size- and book-to-market-adjusted stock returns using returns of five-by-five size- and book-to-market-matched stock portfolios. 
Variable definitions are described in more detail in Table 2. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard 
errors are in parentheses below respective mean values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Monthly Average Abnormal Returns for 3 Months after Announcements for ACC (PRO) Portfolios 
by High/Low Abnormal Attention around the Earnings Announcement 
 
Panel B. Monthly Average Abnormal Returns for 3 Months after Announcements for ACC (PRO) Portfolios 
of Stock with High (Low) Abnormal Attention around the Earnings Announcement                        
by High/Low Attention in the Previous Month 
 
0.179 * -0.044 0.223 ** 0.127 * -0.045 0.172 * 0.002 0.006 -0.004
(0.104) (0.061) (0.129) (0.073) (0.064) (0.118) (0.078) (0.072) (0.106)
0.112 0.116 ** -0.004 0.073 0.132 *** -0.058 0.033 0.192 *** -0.159 **
(0.080) (0.047) (0.099) (0.071) (0.049) (0.091) (0.060) (0.056) (0.082)
LowHigh-Low High-Low
Abnormal Returns 
for Long-Short 
Hedge Portfolios 
Sorted on ACC
Abnormal Returns 
for Long-Short 
Hedge Portfolios 
Sorted on PRO
High Low High Low High High-Low
High-Low
aEDaAAtic+comaAAtic
aAAtic aAAtic+com aED
High Low High Low High LowHigh-Low High-Low
0.061 -0.359 0.420 0.098 -1.367 1.465 ** 0.024 0.146 -0.122
(0.158) (0.661) (0.588) (0.135) (0.788) (0.673) (0.152) (0.178) (0.232)
0.231 0.246 *** -0.015 0.172 0.247 ** -0.075 0.131 0.122 0.010
(0.162) (0.086) (0.199) (0.152) (0.099) (0.192) (0.160) (0.145) (0.220)
Abnormal Returns 
for Long-Short 
Hedge Portfolios 
Sorted on PRO
aAAtic aAAtic+com aED
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
Abnormal Returns 
for Long-Short 
Hedge Portfolios 
Sorted on ACC
aAAtic aAAtic+com aED
High Low High-Low High Low High-Low High Low High-Low
